Justice and Empathy: difficulties and proposals
Keywords:
Jurisprudencia de la virtud, Virtudes judiciales, Emociones, Justicia, Imparcialidad, Virtue Jurisprudence, Judicial Virtues, Emotions, Justice, Impartiality.Abstract
In this paper I will be offering a critique on recent thought about an issue within the domain of Virtue–Jurisprudence which establishes a close connection between the concepts of empathy and justice. According to this idea, a judge´s ability to impart justice is dependent on whether or not she possesses empathy. Both Michael Slote and John Deigh defend this opinion, though in different ways. Nevertheless, I think both positions are subject to criticisms. Even when it seems appropriate to incorporate a reflection on emotions within the judicial realm, it does not seem correct to incorporate the concept of empathy. I will attempt to offer reasons why this is so. After addressing these criticisms, I will suggest what could count as a promissory way of incorporating emotions in the legal sphere.
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