To each his own
Epistemic democracy and the right to be wrong
Keywords:
epistemic democracy, deliberative democracy, reasons for action, populism, Bruno CelanoAbstract
This paper presents an imaginary debate between an advocate of the epistemic view of democracy and someone who claims to have a ‘right to do wrong’, and, consequently, who challenges the thesis according to which the truth is an essential feature of democratic legitimacy. Drawing on some analytical tools developed by Bruno Celano, the discussion fucuses on the relation between reasons and desires, and the role played by criticism in the motivation of (political) action. The result is that, relying on the ‘right to do wrong’, the supporter of a non-epistemic doctrine of democratic practices would have an argument against its opponent which is more consistent that it appears at a first glance, and which would require a more nuanced reply.
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